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Introduction
In October 1970, the heads of state of what was known at the time as
the European Economic Community proclaimed, “[A] united Europe must
be founded upon the common heritage of respect for the liberty and the
rights of men.”1 Decades later, at the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary
of the European Union (EU), the heads of state of today’s European Union
echoed that earlier proclamation:
In the European Union, we are turning our common ideals into reality: for
us, the individual is paramount. His dignity is inviolable. His rights are
inalienable. Women and men enjoy equal rights. We are striving for peace
and freedom, for democracy and the rule of law, for mutual respect and
† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to Mattias
Kumm, Peter Lindseth, Thérèse Murphy, and Ulf Öberg for their comments.
1. European Community, Foreign Ministers of the Six European Cmty. Countries,
First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the Member
States of the European Community, Part One ¶ 5 (Oct. 27, 1970), reprinted in EUROPEAN
FOREIGN POLICY: KEY DOCUMENTS 76 (Christopher Hill & Karen E. Smith eds., 2000).
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shared responsibility, for prosperity and security, for tolerance and participation, for justice and solidarity.2

This vision of Europe, one resting not simply upon economic convenience but upon a common tradition of rights and democracy, is a persistent theme in the history of European integration. With the legitimacy
crisis of the 1990s, it also has become a pressing theme of European integration.3 Rights, according to some, might serve as the building blocks of a
common European identity.4 Europe might not have a single cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious tradition, as did the nation-states of the nineteenth century, but it does, according to constitutional theorists, possess a
liberal democratic tradition of self-government and individual rights.5
Based on this commonality, Europeans might recognize themselves as
rights-bearing and duty-owing members of a single society.
Constitutional patriotism, as this form of identity has been called,
holds tremendous promise.6 Yet, because constitutional patriotism serves
to bind a community together, it carries some of the dangers associated
with the other historically dominant form of community— the nation-state.
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism was belligerent, intolerant,
and monolithic.7 Why should we think that twenty-first-century constitutional patriotism will be any different? In other words, in the European
search for solidarity, the core principles of liberal democracy might be
undermined. The practice of constitutional patriotism might very well
betray its normative aspirations of tolerance and inclusiveness.
Although the dark side of constitutional patriotism has been remarked
by many, there have been few attempts to scrutinize Europe’s emerging
constitutional culture for signs of intolerance.8 Such illiberalism can be
manifested in many ways: foreigners might be unreasonably excluded
through immigration policies, ethnic and religious minorities might not be
treated fairly, or diversity among the national communities that constitute
the European Union might be suppressed in the interest of greater unity.
This article examines attitudes towards national diversity in one piece
of the emerging European Constitution— the right to privacy. There is a
2. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome, Mar. 25, 2007, available at www.eu2007.de/de/News/download_docs/
Maerz/0324-RA A/English.pdf.
3. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler et al., European Democracy and Its Critique, 18 WEST EUR.
POL. 4 (1995).
4. See Gráinne de Búrca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union:
Europe’s Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 555, 573
(2004).
5. See Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism, 6
INT’L J. CONST. L. 117, 120 (2008).
6. See generally JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM (2007); Jan-Werner Müller & Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Patriotism: An Introduction, 6 INT’L J.
CONST. L 67 (2008).
7. See Michael Howard, War and Nations, in NATIONALISM 254, 254– 55 (John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1994).
8. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 173, 186– 87 (2005).
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thick constitutional culture of privacy in Europe.9 The familiar debate of
how to balance the right to privacy against freedom of expression, the market, and public security can be heard in many places: before the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights; in the European
Parliament and the European Council; and before Europe’s numerous data
privacy ombudsmen. In these places, the less familiar problem of tolerance
of diversity among Europe’s different national communities also arises.
These communities all recognize a private sphere that sometimes deserves
to be protected and that sometimes must give way to the demands of
others. Yet these same communities also differ in their definition of the
private sphere and the circumstances under which this private sphere must
be sacrificed for the sake of other values, such as freedom of expression.10
Thus, the right to privacy poses squarely the dilemma of constitutional
patriotism: Can a right that is common to all of Europe nonetheless
acknowledge and accommodate national diversity?
This article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the theory of constitutional patriotism and the related concept of constitutional tolerance. Part
II moves to the right to privacy. It outlines the legal framework for the right
to privacy, with special attention to data protection because of the historically important role of this policy area in the European Union. Part III
explores the challenge of diversity for European constitutionalism by comparing two recent judgments involving a similar issue of privacy law but
decided by two different European courts: Criminal Proceedings Against
Bodil Lindqvist, decided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ),11 and Von
Hannover v. Germany (Princess of Monaco), decided by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).12 Both cases examined the relationship
between privacy and freedom of expression, but while the ECJ deferred to
the national court’s resolution of the matter, the ECtHR decided the question and did so contrary to the national court’s ruling.13
Based on the theory of constitutional patriotism, the last section
argues in favor of the deferential approach taken by the ECJ. Although the
doctrinal tools available to the two courts differ, the same deferential result
could be accomplished by the ECtHR through greater resort to its doctrine
of margin of appreciation. In doing so, the ECtHR would recognize, as the
Court of Justice has done, that the answer to many difficult questions of
9. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 610 (2007) [hereinafter
Bignami, European Versus American Liberty].
10. See Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspaper, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] A.C.
457, ¶ 11 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/
00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 23 (2005).
11. Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971.
12. Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1.
13. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13024 (“[I]t is for the authorities and courts of the
Member States not only to interpret their national law in a manner consistent with
Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of it which
would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal
order or with other general principles of the Community law . . . .”); see also Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 27– 29.
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constitutional law can only be found in the thick institutional and cultural
setting of national constitutional orders. The European constitutional
order is still too thin to settle many of the heated conflicts among rightsholders that emerge routinely at the national level.
This favorable assessment of the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation is
somewhat controversial. Many human rights scholars have criticized the
ECtHR’s resort to the doctrine as the abandonment of rights, morality, and
reason in the face of powerful, oppressive states.14 Deference to the member states, according to the critics, represents capitulation to repressive
human rights practices. Other commentators, however, have defended the
margin of appreciation, both from a moral theory of rights15 and from a
pragmatic position related to the limits of international law.16 This analysis adds to the earlier defenses of the margin of appreciation by revealing
the constitutional nature of ECtHR adjudication. Given the frenetic pace of
European integration and the importance of the ECtHR in affirming rights,
the ECtHR today should be regarded as not simply an international human
rights tribunal but also a constitutional court. The ECtHR, like the ECJ, is
entrusted with a critical element of Europe’s constitutional self-identity—
fundamental rights. In other words, the ECtHR is an institutional guarantor of European constitutional patriotism. In adjudicating rights, therefore,
the ECtHR should be self-conscious of the importance of fundamental
rights in their particular, geographic and historical instantiations to
national self-identities and local solidarities. Before resolving any particular rights conflict— like the clash between privacy and speech in Von Hannover— the ECtHR should consider whether indeed the best constitutional
order for Europe would instead be tolerance of national diversity.
I.

Constitutional Patriotism

The idea that a constitution not only organizes power within a society
but also provides a source of allegiance that enables the formation of that
society is commonly associated with German political theory.17 As JanWerner Müller explains, the circumstances of post-war Germany placed
the Basic Law and the Constitutional Court at the heart of German political culture.18 The Constitutional Court has been immensely successful at
resolving highly contentious political disputes.19 Today, therefore, the
Constitutional Court is one of the most highly respected institution in Ger14. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 847 (1999); George Letsas, Two Concepts of the
Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 731– 32 (2006).
15. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 61– 63 (2003).
16. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 315– 17 (1997).
17. See Jan-Werner Müller, A ‘Thick’ Constitutional Patriotism for the EU?: On Morality, Memory and Militancy, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE POST-NATIONAL UNION 375,
378 (Erik Odvar Eriksen et al. eds., 2006).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 380.
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man political life.20 At the same time, the Basic Law emerged as the focal
point in the struggle to defend the German state against the twin threats of
neo-fascism and communism.21 German citizens were urged, based on
their allegiance to the democratic values and civil liberties enshrined in the
Basic Law, to reject political extremism and come to the defense of German
democracy.22
In the view of many thinkers, a constitution for the European Union
would engender a similar form of allegiance, not to any particular national
order, but to a Europe-wide political community.23 Probably the bestknown exponent of constitutional patriotism for the European Union is the
renowned political philosopher Jürgen Habermas.24 According to
Habermas, the democratic deliberation facilitated by the adoption of a constitution would promote identification with the European project.25 This
form of constitutionalism would engender genuinely post-national citizenship,26 because individuals would develop a sense of belonging to a
Europe-wide community based on their participation in a democratic process, not based on their blood ties or cultural background.27
As many have pointed out, deliberative democracy is a very demanding form of rule by the people.28 Citizens are called upon to constantly reexamine and revise their values and interests in communication with other
citizens that inhabit the public sphere. For the normative ideal to be
achieved, four key criteria must be satisfied. First, deliberation must be
inclusive; all citizens should have the opportunity to participate in the
deliberation. Second, the citizens who participate in the deliberation must
have equality of voice. They must all be heard and considered. Third, in
the deliberation, deliberative as opposed to strategic rationality must prevail. Agreement must come from genuine consensus on the political principle under discussion. In other words, decisions must be made through
appeal to commonly accepted reasons— what Habermas calls validity
claims— not through bargaining among competing interests.29 Such bargaining is considered harmful to democracy because certain interests inevitably wield more power than others and therefore dominate the bargaining
process. Moreover, even if power could be assumed away, collective deci20. Id. at 378.
21. See id. at 380, 382– 83.
22. See id.
23. See Jürgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, NEW LEFT REV.,
Sept.– Oct. 2001, at 5, 15– 16 (2001) (outlining philosophical groundwork for the idea
now known as constitutional patriotism).
24. See, e.g., Müller, supra note 17, at 380– 83 (discussing Habermas).
25. See Habermas, supra note 23, at 16.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., Jack Knight & James Johnson, Aggregation and Deliberation, 22 POL.
THEORY 277 (1994).
29. See Thomas Gehring, Communicative Rationality in European Governance? Interests and Communicative Action in Functionally Differentiated Single Market Regulation, in
EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE, DELIBERATION, AND THE QUEST FOR DEMOCRATISATION 57, 74 (Erik
O. Eriksen et al. eds., 2003).
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sion-making based on compromises among particularistic interests is not
capable of obtaining the common good. Last, deliberation must continue
indefinitely until consensus is reached. Given the limits on the time and
resources that can be dedicated to deliberation, consensus on every item
on the public agenda is unattainable. Therefore, in the absence of consensus, a decision must be taken temporarily, following a commonly accepted
procedural rule.
Deliberative democracy is not only an extremely ambitious form of
democracy, but it is also highly universalistic. Under this theory, the society that self-governs could very well be the world, not simply a particular
nation or region. Unlike deliberative democracy in American political theory, which is rooted in the republican tradition, Habermas’s starting point
is man’s universal capacity for language.30 The basic similarities underpinning language are the grounds for claiming that all individuals share the
same “communicative rationality” through which they can reach agreement
on matters of common concern.31 An individual’s capacity to recognize
others as equals in the deliberative enterprise is rooted in reason, not in
geography or history. Thus, it should be possible to agree that the essentials of deliberative democracy be extended to all.
For these reasons, the version of constitutional patriotism expounded
by Habermas has given rise to deep skepticism.32 The type of reason and
universalism required by Habermas’s theory is considered to be too far
removed from the realities of human nature for deliberative democracy to
be achievable.33 But the idea of constitutional patriotism— the possibility
of European citizenship based on the liberal ideals contained in a constitution and experienced as part of a constitutional culture— has had enormous purchase in Europe. This idea spurred the long process that
culminated in the Constitution for Europe. Of course, that Constitution
failed in popular referenda held in France and the Netherlands.34 Nevertheless, the possibility of rooting European citizenship in a set of commonly held ideals about the right and good mode of conducting life in a
human community persists.35
The liberal values found in most modern constitutions can only be
considered virtuous. Yet building allegiance to a community based on such
values is problematic. The act of subscribing to a single set of beliefs— even
virtuous ones— carries the danger of suppressing alternative beliefs. In
other words, constitutional patriots might not tolerate dissent from their
version of the right and good. This intolerance might not be shown only to
30. See William Rehg, Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy: An Overview of the Argument, in HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL THEORY 166, 170– 71 (David M. Rasmussen ed., 1996).
31. See Gehring, supra note 29, at 69.
32. See, e.g., John P. McCormick, Habermas, Supranational Democracy, and the European Constitution, 2 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 398, 398– 99 (2006).
33. See id. at 412– 23.
34. EU Constitution: Where Member States Stand, BBC NEWS, March 25, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm.
35. See Kumm, supra note 5, at 120.

\\server05\productn\C\CIN\41-2\CIN201.txt

2008

unknown

Seq: 7

The Case for Tolerant Constitutional Patriotism

10-OCT-08

13:16

217

those extremists bent on destroying liberal values, such as neo-Nazi and
militant Communist parties.36 It might also silence legitimate disagreement about the correct interpretation and application of critical elements
of the liberal democratic canon. Jans-Werner Müller incisively frames the
critique:
[C]ivic nationalism— under which one is tempted to subsume constitutional
patriotism— is still nationalism, and not automatically less fraught with danger in contrast with cultural nationalism. In particular, it still aims at homogeneity among citizens in a way that would have been recognizable to
antiliberals like Carl Schmitt as indispensable for democracy, and that more
or less directly endangers values such as inclusiveness, individualism, and
diversity.37

The irony of intolerant constitutional patriotism is especially acute in
the European Union. There, hostility towards diversity not only betrays the
values at the core of liberal democracy but also undermines the constitutional system already in place. Among legal scholars, Joseph Weiler has put
forward the most exhaustive analysis of the dangers of constitutional patriotism for the European Union.38 The most fundamental attribute of the
European constitutional system to have emerged over the years, Weiler
argues, is constitutional tolerance.39 In accepting the authority of the pronouncements of the European Court of Justice, national courts allow the
views of other political communities to shape the constitutional fabric of
their own community.40 As Weiler puts it, European law is “accepted as an
autonomous voluntary act, endlessly renewed on each occasion, of subordination, in the discrete areas governed by Europe, to a norm which is the
aggregate expression of other wills, other political identities, other political
communities.”41 Likewise, the European Court of Justice defers to the
views of national courts in fashioning European law.42 From this relationship of mutual deference, Weiler draws the conclusion that a written European constitution, adopted by a constitutional convention, is
undesirable.43 Whether such a constitution would indeed undermine constitutional tolerance, as Weiler argues, is debatable.44 But the important
point is that the European constitutional order is intrinsically pluralist, and
any effort to impose a hegemonic belief system in the interest of constitu36. See generally ROGER GRIFFIN, MODERNISM AND FASCISM: THE SENSE OF A BEGINNING
MUSSOLINI AND HITLER (1995).
37. Jan-Werner Müller, Three Objections to Constitutional Patriotism, 14 CONSTELLATIONS 197, 201 (2007).
38. See J.H.H. Weiler, In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg,
in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 7, 7– 23 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene
Wind eds., 2003).
39. See id.
40. See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 10, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
41. Weiler, supra note 38, at 21.
42. See Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 272, 279 (2005).
43. See Weiler, supra note 38, at 21– 23.
44. See id.
UNDER
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tional patriotism would be antithetical to the character of Europe. In fashioning a constitutional identity for Europe, therefore, it is imperative that
the courts and other law-making institutions permit legitimate disagreement over the content of that identity. It is essential to preserve constitutional tolerance.
II. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is a perfect vehicle for exploring the tension
between constitutional patriotism and constitutional tolerance. The right
to privacy has long been an element of the European constitutional system,45 yet it is an element on which national constitutional systems display
considerable variation. Privacy claims routinely clash with other claims:
my right to keep certain matters to myself conflicts with the right of others
to learn about me for the purpose of public debate, market transactions,
public security, and more. How a constitutional system mediates between
the right of secrecy and the right to know is a defining feature of that society and one that varies tremendously among political communities. How
such pluralism has been handled in Europe can offer guidance on the more
general problem of reconciling a single set of European constitutional ideals with national diversity.
The European right to privacy is the product of two distinct but overlapping political systems: the European Union and the Council of Europe.
Historically, the Council of Europe came first.46 The Council of Europe
system also has the broadest coverage: the application of the right to privacy in the Council of Europe system was never limited to certain domains
of state activity as it was in the European Union, with its focus on the
market. However, today, especially in the domain of data privacy, the
European Union is the more important system. Compared to the Council
of Europe, it has a denser framework of laws and administrative instruments with a tighter enforcement system of regulators and courts.47
The two political systems overlap because of the influence that the
first-in-time one has been able to exert over the later-in-time one.48 As is
well known, the European Court of Justice looks to the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights to establish new rights.49 Furthermore, the European
Union’s legislation on data privacy draws on the earlier Council of Europe
Convention in that area.50
45. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
46. See CLAIRE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (4th ed. 2006).
47. See Bignami, European Versus American Liberty, supra note 9, at 647– 48.
48. See id. at 643.
49. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
323– 30 (3d ed. 2003).
50. See Bignami, European Versus American Liberty, supra note 9, at 644.
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The right to private life is protected under Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.
Article 8— Right to respect for private and family life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.51

Initially, the European Court of Human Rights interpreted the right of
privacy to apply only against the government and only in those situations
in which the space or the type of fact fit squarely with commonplace understandings of what counted as private.52 As with other Convention rights,
however, the Court soon acknowledged that the right to privacy applied
not just against the government but also against other individuals because
states should be held responsible for all rights violations occurring within
their territories.53 The Court also gradually expanded those categories of
information deemed to be private and therefore protected under the right
to private life.54 Today, any information about a person, no matter how
banal or how widely known, is considered private as long as it is systematically stored and collected.55 Likewise, even behavior in a public place is
considered private if it is recorded and disseminated in a manner that
could not reasonably have been anticipated by the individual concerned.56
Under the case law of the Court, an interference with the right to private life must satisfy three conditions to be considered legal.57 First, if the
processing is done by a public authority or for a public purpose, it must be
authorized by a law, accessible to the public, and it must have sufficiently
precise provisions to curb arbitrary government action and to put citizens
on notice of possible incursions into their private sphere.58 Second, the
51. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 45, art. 8.
52. IAIN CAMERON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 91– 101 (2000).
53. See generally Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1
(2005) (applying Article 8 to case of privacy violation by the media).
54. CAMERON, supra note 52, at 70– 101.
55. Segerstedt-Wiberg v. Sweden, App. No. 62332/00, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2, ¶¶ 71-72
(2007).
56. Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 23.
57. Francesca Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The
Data Retention Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 233, 242 (2007) [hereinafter Bignami, Privacy
and Law Enforcement].
58. See Amann v Switzerland, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 266.
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purpose of the interference must be legitimate.59 Namely, the purpose
must be related to one of the categories listed in Article 8.60 It must be “in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”61
Third, the interference with private life must be proportional.62 The
proportionality inquiry generally consists of three distinct steps.63 First, is
there evidence that government action can achieve the stated purpose?64
Second, is the government action necessary for accomplishing the stated
purpose or would alternative means accomplish the same purpose with a
lesser burden on the privacy right?65 Finally, even though there might be
no alternative means for accomplishing the same purpose, is the burden on
the right to privacy nonetheless intolerable, requiring the law to be withdrawn?66 The burden of justification under the proportionality test lies
with the government and varies tremendously, depending on the gravity of
the interference with the right to private life and the public interest being
pursued: the more significant the interference, the higher the burden on the
government; the more important the public purpose, the lower the burden
on the government.67
2.

Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data

Long before the European Court of Human Rights interpreted the right
to privacy to apply broadly to any type of information about a person, a
specific set of rules relating to personal data was negotiated by the members of the Council of Europe.68 The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data was adopted
in 1980 and was opened for ratification in January 1981.69 As of May
2007, it has been ratified by thirty-eight of the forty-six members of the
Council of Europe and it has been signed but not ratified by six more member states.70 The rules contained in the Convention apply to all those
59. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 45, art. 8.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement, supra note 57, at 242.
63. Id. at 246.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Case C-317/04 & C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. I-4721, ¶¶ 227– 30.
68. See id. ¶¶ 228– 30.
69. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data art. 5(b), Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Personal Data
Convention]; see COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY:
POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 72 (2003).
70. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/
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engaged in personal data processing— market actors, the media, government agencies, and others.71
For purposes of understanding the legal rules contained in the Convention, it is useful to divide personal data processing into a number of
different phases: collection, storage, use, and dissemination to third parties. Under the Convention, personal data must be “obtained and
processed fairly and lawfully.”72 Generally speaking, this is interpreted to
mean either that individuals must consent to the collection and use of their
information or that a piece of legislation must authorize personal data
processing, specifying the public reasons that necessitate personal data
processing. The Convention restricts the amount and type of personal
information that may be collected: it must be gathered for “specific and
legitimate purposes,”73 and it must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored.”74 Certain categories of personal information, if collected, must be treated with special
care: “Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious
or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life,
may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal convictions.”75
Moving past collection to the storage of information, data-protection
actors must guarantee that personal data is “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.”76 Safeguards must be put into place to protect the
data from theft and other forms of security breaches: “Appropriate security
measures shall be taken for the protection of personal data stored in automated data files against accidental or unauthorized destruction or accidental loss as well as against unauthorized access, alteration or
dissemination.”77
As for use and dissemination, personal data may be used only for
those purposes originally contemplated and only by those organizations
for whom the data was originally intended.78 It may be put to other uses
and shared with other organizations only if doing so is necessary to fulfill
the original purposes of data collection.79 Last, the time during which perChercheSig.asp?NT=108&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited May 10, 2008) (listing
member states that have ratified the Convention).
71. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, supra note 69, art. 3 (“The Parties undertake to apply this convention to automated personal data files and automatic processing of personal data in the
public and private sectors.”).
72. Id. art. 5(a).
73. Id. art. 5(b).
74. Id. art. 5(c).
75. Id. art. 6.
76. Id. art. 5(d).
77. Id. art. 7.
78. Id. art. 5 (“Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be: stored for
specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes . . . .”).
79. Id.
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sonal information may be retained is limited: personal information should
be “preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects
for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are
stored.”80
The Convention also pays some attention to remedies.81 It provides
that individuals should have a right of access to their personal information.82 This right guarantees that individuals will know what information
about them is held and by which institutions. Moreover, once individuals
have obtained access to their information, they have an opportunity to correct any incorrect information.83 Finally, individuals have a right to
demand that unlawfully processed information— say, information retained
for longer than necessary— be deleted.84
The basic theory behind these rules is the less personal data processing, the better. The objectionable nature of personal data processing can
only be comprehended in light of the fundamental rights origins of data
privacy. Each time information about an individual is collected, personal
autonomy is put at risk. Even though liberal societies disagree as to what
is private and what is public, they all acknowledge that, in certain spaces
and over certain matters, individuals are entitled to privacy.85 If they so
choose, individuals are entitled to bar access by others to their private
spheres.86 This entitlement stems from the duty of respect for others.
Although certain pieces of personal information might appear far removed
from this private sphere of control and autonomy, once such information
is combined, manipulated, and disseminated, it might very well be
revealing of the private sphere.
Of course, there are other rationales for data privacy. Personal information in the hands of powerful actors can be used for illiberal ends like
the suppression of political dissent and discrimination based on religion,
race, or ethnic origins.87 Incorrect personal information can lead to all
sorts of disastrous consequences for the individuals involved.88 They
might be unfairly detained or wrongly denied a welfare benefit.89 Further,
if personal information is stolen, individuals can be robbed of their assets
80. Id. art. 5(e).
81. Id. arts. 10, 17.
82. Id. arts. 8(a)– 8(c).
83. Id. art. 8(c).
84. Id.
85. See AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 202– 04 (Naomi Goldblum trans.,
1996); Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PRIVACY 1, 1– 3 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
86. See MARGALIT, supra note 85, at 204; Benn, supra note 85, at 3– 4.
87. See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 94– 134 (2002); LEWIS P. LAPHAM,
GAG RULE: ON THE SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT AND THE STIFLING OF DEMOCRACY 55– 67
(2004); Reg Whitaker, After 9/11: A Surveillance State?, in LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND
THE ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 52, 54– 58 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003).
88. See Francesca Bignami, Towards a Right to Privacy in Transnational Intelligence
Networks, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 667– 69 (2007) [hereinafter Bignami, Towards a Right
to Privacy].
89. Id. at 668.

R
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or fraudulently charged with onerous debts.90 Yet, at the root of data privacy is the principle of autonomy. Even in a world in which, thanks to
technology, acquiring knowledge about others is virtually effortless, personal autonomy must be respected.
Data-protection rules and the fundamental right to privacy are not
only related in political theory but also in legal doctrine. Most of the rules
reviewed earlier can be conceived as guidance for the proportionality investigation required under fundamental rights law. Since every instance in
which personal data is collected constitutes an intrusion into private life,
personal data must be collected and stored for specific and legitimate purposes and may not be used in a way incompatible with those purposes.91
To ensure that personal data processing can accomplish the government’s
purpose— as is required under proportionality— all such data must be “adequate” and “relevant” to that purpose.92 Likewise, such data must be
“accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.”93
Not only must data processing be able to achieve the government purpose, but it must be necessary to achieve that purpose.94 As such, there is a
requirement that the amount of data processed and the period during
which it is stored be no more than necessary to accomplish the purpose.95
Because the processing of certain types of personal data— revealing racial
origin, political opinions, religious or other beliefs; concerning health or
sexual life; or relating to criminal convictions— constitutes a particularly
grave interference with privacy, special precautions must be taken.96
Finally, as a special safeguard for the privacy right, individuals should have
the right to check their personal data to ensure that it is both accurate and
processed in accordance with the law. Most of these limitations on data
collection and processing can be conceived as less rights-burdensome
means of accomplishing the same government purpose. Each time a personal data-processing system is put into place, it must contain safeguards
and restrictions that ensure that the privacy interest in personal data is
compromised as little as possible. Last, the Convention permits exceptions
in certain classes of cases, but only if the resulting burden on the privacy
right is proportionate to the aim being pursued by permitting the
exception.97

90. See Michael W. Perl, It’s Not Always About the Money: Why the State Identity Theft
Laws Fail to Adequately Address Criminal Record Identity Theft, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 169, 169– 81 (2003); Holly W. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New Law,
30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 237, 237– 51 (2004).
91. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, supra note 69, art. 5(b).
92. Id. art. 5(c).
93. Id. art. 5(d).
94. Id. arts. 5(b)– (c), 5(e).
95. Id. art. 5(c), 5(e).
96. Id. art. 6.
97. Id. art. 9.
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Fundamental rights have long been part of the legal and political discourse of the European Union.98 Until recently, however, such rights were
imported into the EU legal order from national constitutions and the European Convention on Human Rights. As the Court of Justice has never tired
of repeating,
It must also be stated that fundamental rights form an integral part of the
general principles of law whose obser vance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international
instruments for the protection of human rights on which the Member States
have collaborated or to which they are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR
has special significance.99

In 2000, however, the European Union finally obtained its own statement of fundamental rights with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.100
The Charter includes a number of rights that reflect the circumstances of
modern-day society.101 The right to privacy is one of them.102 The Charter dedicates two articles to privacy. The first, Article 7, copies this language from the European Convention on Human Rights: “Everyone has the
right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”103 The second, however, innovates by specifically guaranteeing privacy in the age of electronic technology and the worldwide web:
Article 8— Protection of personal data
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the
right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.104
98. Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, Council, and Commission of April
5, 1977, 1977 O.J. (C 103) 1, 1 (“1. The European Parliament, the Council and the
Commission stress the prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental
rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
2. In the exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of the European Communities they respect and will continue to respect these rights.”).
99. Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone v. Conseil
des Ministres, 3 C.M.L.R. 28 (2007).
100. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1, 8.
101. See, e.g., id. art. 14 (right to education).
102. See id. arts. 7– 8.
103. Id. art. 7.
104. Id. art. 8.
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Much of the substance of this right of personal data protection should
be familiar from the earlier discussion of the Council of Europe Convention on Automatic Processing of Personal Data.105 The requirement of an
independent authority is also familiar to data-protection advocates.106
Independent authorities, established to oversee compliance with data-protection rules, have been a fixture of national data-protection schemes since
the early 1970s.107 By the mid-1990s, consensus on the desirability of an
independent authority had emerged at the European level, first in the EU
Directive discussed below and then in a special protocol to the Convention
on Automatic Processing of Personal Data.108
2.

The Data Protection Directive

In 1995, the Data Protection Directive (the Directive) was adopted by
the European Union.109 Today, all Member States have implementation
legislation in place.110 The Directive builds on the Convention on Automatic Processing of Personal Data in a number of respects. Although the
Directive only sets down rules for activities that come under the marketoriented First Pillar, those rules are far more detailed than those contained
in the Convention on Automatic Processing of Personal Data.111 The
Directive begins with a restatement of the Convention’s core provisions on
lawfulness, specific purposes, necessity, accuracy, and limited data retention.112 Like the Convention, the Directive recognizes certain categories of
personal information that should receive special protection,113 gives individuals a right of access to their personal information,114 and imposes a
duty to adopt security measures to protect personal data.115 These provisions, however, are far more detailed and onerous than the spare principles
105. See generally Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, supra note 69.
106. See, e.g., COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 164– 80 (1992).
107. See id.
108. See Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Regarding Super visory Authorities
and Transborder Data Flows, Nov. 8, 2001, Europ. T.S. No. 181.
109. Eur. Parl. & Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/
index_en.htm (follow ‘pdf version’ Part 1 & Part 2) [hereinafter 1995 Data Protection
Directive].
110. For a list of member countries and the status of implementation of the 1995
Directive, see European Commission, Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, http://
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2008).
111. Compare 1995 Data Protection Directive, supra note 109, with Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, supra
note 69.
112. 1995 Data Protection Directive, supra note 109, art. 6.
113. Id. art. 8.
114. Id. art. 12.
115. Id. art. 17.
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set down in the Convention.116 The Directive also elaborates on lawfulness
by setting out those circumstances under which collection and use of personal data is permitted.117
The proportionality principle, familiar from the Council of Europe
context, appears throughout the Directive. Government actors and private
firms that seek to collect and process personal information must demonstrate that their operations satisfy the proportionality principle— that the
burden imposed on the right to personal data protection is proportionate
to the aim being pursued through their data-processing operations.118 Any
exceptions to the data-protection guarantees contained in the Directive
must be proportionate to the aims being pursued in taking advantage of
the exception.119 To the extent that other rights— in particular freedom of
expression— interfere with the right to personal data protection, that interference must be proportional.120
The Directive creates three new sets of rights and duties with respect to
the Convention. First, at the time that personal information is collected or
transmitted to third parties, individuals must be informed of the identity of
the data processor, the purposes of the data processing, and a number of
other aspects of the data-processing operation.121 Second, in a provision
drawn directly from French data-protection law, individuals have the right
to object to automatic data processing with potentially adverse effects for
that individual.122 Thus, for instance, an individual denied credit by a
financial institution based entirely on a computerized review of that individual’s application may request that the application be reviewed by an
employee of the bank. Third, the Directive prohibits the transfer of personal data to third countries unless those countries’ laws adequately protect data privacy or one of a number of other privacy-protecting criteria are
met.123
Perhaps most importantly, the Directive includes the enforcement
apparatus that the Convention lacks. It requires that all Member States
establish an independent data-protection authority.124 These authorities
must have the powers necessary to oversee and enforce compliance with
116. For the sparer provisions of the Personal Data Convention, see Convention for
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
supra note 69, art. 6 (special categories of data) (“Personal data revealing racial origin,
political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning
health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides
appropriate safeguards. The same shall apply to personal data relating to criminal convictions.”) and art. 4 (duties of the parties) (“1. Each Party shall take the necessary
measures in its domestic law to give effect to the basic principles for data protection set
out in this chapter. 2. These measures shall be taken at the latest at the time of entry
into force of this convention in respect of that Party.”).
117. 1995 Data Protection Directive, supra note 109, art. 7.
118. Id. art. 7(f).
119. Id. arts. 11– 13, 26.
120. Id. arts. 9, 13.
121. Id. arts. 10– 11.
122. Id. art. 15.
123. Id. arts. 25– 26.
124. Id. art. 28.
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data-protection law.125 The Directive anticipates that, under certain circumstances, firms and government agencies that process personal data
will be required to notify the data-protection authority of their operations
and, occasionally, obtain prior authorization.126 The Directive also
requires that national data-protection authorities have the power to inspect
data users in order to detect data-protection violations.127 Data-protection
authorities must have remedial powers, such as the power to prohibit dataprocessing operations that violate the rules.128 Additionally, they must
have the power to sanction those firms and government agencies that break
the rules.129
On the European, as opposed to national, level, two separate committees enforce the Directive.130 One committee is responsible for regulating
third-country transfers in line with privacy principles.131 The other—
known as the Article 29 Working Party— has broad-ranging jurisdiction to
promulgate opinions on most data-protection issues that arise under the
Data Protection Directive.132 Although the Working Party’s opinions are
not formally binding, they are generally followed by other EU institutions
and national authorities and as a consequence, the Working Party’s legal
interpretations are treated as if they were binding by most regulated entities.133 In addition to this regulatory apparatus, an EU-level data-protection authority has been established. This authority, the European Data
Protection Super visor, enforces data-protection rules against EU
institutions.134
3.

Additional EU Data Protection Legislation

The Directive is the European Union’s most comprehensive piece of
data protection legislation. It applies, however, only to activities that fall
under the First Pillar, namely market-based activities.135 A separate set of
data-protection instruments cover cooperation on immigration and cooperation on criminal justice under the Third Pillar.136 Because their essentials
125. Id.
126. Id. arts. 18– 20.
127. Id. art. 28.
128. Id.
129. Id. arts. 24, 28.
130. CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 9– 12
(2003).
131. 1995 Data Protection Directive, supra note 109, art. 26.
132. See id. art. 30.
133. KUNER, supra note 130, at 9– 10.
134. See generally Proposal for a Decision of the Eur. Parl., of the Council and of the
Commission on the Regulations and General Conditions for the Performance of the Duties of
the European Data Protection Supervisor, COM (2001) 411 final (July 21, 2001).
135. Comm. on Citizens’ Freedoms & Rights, Justice & Home Affairs, Report on the
First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), at 13,
COM (2003) 265 final (Feb. 24, 2004).
136. See generally Peter J. Hustinx, Personal Data Protection Yesterday, Today,
Tomorrow, WARSAW, May 12, 2006, at 132, available at http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publications/Speeches/2006/06-05-12_Art_
third_pillar_EN.pdf.
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largely replicate the terms of the Convention and the Directive, only the
briefest of overviews is necessary here.
To effectively cooperate on immigration and criminal justice, a number of EU databases have been established.137 These databases are covered
by separate sets of data protection provisions. National authorities that
exchange immigration and crime-related information through the
Schengen Information System are bound by the data-protection guarantees
in the Schengen Convention.138 The terms of the Europol Convention
apply to the exchange of crime-related information through the Europol
Information System.139 When national prosecutors and courts exchange
information through the Eurojust Information System, they are bound by
the data-protection provisions of the decision establishing that information
system.140 The data-protection provisions of the basic regulation creating
the Customs Information System apply when national customs officers
exchange information related to smuggling and other offenses through that
computer system.141 Currently under negotiation is a Third-Pillar Framework Decision that will replace this complicated, largely overlapping, set of
laws with one single legislative scheme.142 The Framework Decision will
also significantly extend the coverage of EU data-protection guarantees:
when national police, prosecutors, and the courts cooperate to combat
crime under the Third Pillar and, in the process, exchange personal information on criminal suspects, they will be bound by the terms of the Framework Decision.
Today, therefore, the only domain of European social life that is still
untouched by EU data protection law is intelligence-gathering by national
spy agencies. National spy agencies like Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Federal Intelligence Service generally do not
come within the reach of EU law at all. These agencies have been expressly
excluded from the ambit of the European Union’s Third Pillar.143 To the
extent that spy agencies come within the jurisdiction of the European
Union at all, they would have to be regulated under the Second Pillar. At
present, there are no proposals to do so.
137. See Bignami, Towards a Right to Privacy, supra note 88, at 666– 67.
138. Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common
Borders, tit. IV, Sept. 22, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19.
139. Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty of European Union, on the Establishment of a European Police Office, arts. 2– 3, 1995 O.J. (C 316) 2.
140. Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 Setting Up Eurojust with a View to
Reinforcing the Fight Against Serious Crime, art. 5, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 1, 3.
141. Council Regulation 515/97, On Mutual Assistance Between the Administrative
Authorities of the Member States and Cooperation Between the Latter and the Commission to Ensure the Correct Application of the Law on Customs and Agricultural Matters,
art. 30, 1997 O.J. (L 82) 1.
142. Note from Presidency to Delegations on Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Mar. 13, 2007).
143. The Third Pillar applies to “Police and Judicial Cooperation on Criminal Matters” and, thus, not to spies. CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 49, at 39– 41.
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III. The European Constitutional Culture of Privacy
In a series of cases, the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Court of Justice have grappled with the meaning of these privacy
provisions.144 They have determined the scope of the private sphere protected by European law and the nature of the safeguards afforded under
European law. The courts have also decided under which circumstances it
might be permissible to intrude upon privacy to further the legitimate purposes of other members of society. The right to speak, to be safe, and to
transact in the marketplace can all come into conflict with the right to privacy. These moral and legal quandaries have become especially difficult
with the massive diffusion of new information technologies. Information
technologies hold extraordinary promise for human creativity and social
communication yet they also pose an immense threat to privacy. Put simply, with the widespread availability of new information technologies, the
temptation to spy on one’s neighbors or one’s citizens is extraordinary.
This section examines how the courts have addressed these issues in
the unique context of Europe’s plural legal order. The focus is on two cases
involving the balance between the right to privacy and the right to speech.
The first, decided by the European Court of Justice, considered the interference with the right to privacy caused by a personal webpage, available
throughout the world through the Internet.145 Although the Court recognized the right to privacy and the right to speech as fundamental components of the European constitutional order, it left the task of balancing the
two values to the national court and the national constitutional order.146
The second case, decided by the European Court of Human Rights,
reached a very different conclusion. That case involved the interference
with a celebrity’s right to privacy caused by the publication of paparazzi
photographs in a weekly magazine.147 In its judgment, the Court not only
recognized the importance of the right to expression and the right to privacy in the European legal order but also decided in favor of the celebrity’s
right to privacy.148 The reasoning in these two cases both demonstrates
the tension between European constitutionalism and longstanding national
legal orders and reveals the jurisprudential techniques developed by
Europe’s courts to accommodate national diversity.
A.

Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist

The European Court of Justice had occasion to consider at length the
Data Protection Directive in Criminal Proceedings Against Bodil Lindqvist.149
144. In the European Court of Human Rights, see Von Hannover v. Germany, App.
No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2005); Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R
123. In the European Court of Justice, see Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings
Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971; Case T-194/04; Bavarian Lager Co. v. Comm’n,
1999 E.C.R. 11-3217.
145. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13006.
146. Id. at I-13025.
147. Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 5.
148. Id. at 28.
149. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-12971.
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Lindqvist volunteered as a catechist in her local parish in Sweden.150 At
the same time, she took a computer class in which she learned how to
create websites.151 She then created her own personal webpage, on which
she posted information designed to assist her fellow parishioners preparing for catechism.152 The website also included information on herself
and eighteen colleagues from her parish, all identified by name.153 The
information on her colleagues covered a variety of topics: their telephone
numbers, their jobs and hobbies, their family circumstances, and in the
case of one colleague, the fact that she had injured her foot and, therefore,
was on half-time medical leave from her job.154 Lindqvist posted this information without first obtaining the consent of her fellow catechists,
although when she learned that some of them objected to the dissemination of their information, she promptly removed it from the website.155
Under the Swedish law implementing the Directive, all personal data
processors had to register their operations with the Swedish data-protection authority.156 They also had to obtain authorization from the dataprotection authority if they planned to process sensitive data, such as
health information, or to transfer personal data to a country outside the
European Union.157 Lindqvist was unaware of this requirement when she
first created her website but subsequently was informed of the requirement
by an acquaintance.158 She then paid a visit to her local police station to
inquire about her legal duties, at which point the police referred the matter
to the public prosecutor.159 Lindqvist was prosecuted and convicted for
various breaches of the Swedish law.160 Her punishment was a criminal
fine of 4000 SEK.161
On appeal, the Swedish court referred a number of questions regarding the proper interpretation of the Directive— and therefore also the Swedish implementing law— to the European Court of Justice.162 The Court
easily found that uploading personal data onto Lindqvist’s website consti150. Id. at I-13002.
151. E-mail from Xavier Lewis, Member of the European Comm’n Legal Serv., to
Francesca Bignami, Professor of Law, Duke University Sch. of Law (Feb. 18, 2008, 10:51
EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lewis E-mail].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13002.
155. Id. at I-13003.
156. See 36 § Personuppgiftslag (SFS 1998:204) (Swed.).
157. See 13 § Personuppgiftslag (SFS 1998:204) (Swed.) (prohibiting the processing
of sensitive personal data); 33 § Personuppgiftslag (SFS 1998:204) (Swed.) (prohibiting
the transfer of processed personal data to countries that lack adequate protections for
personal data); 35 § Personuppgiftslag (SFS 1998:204) (Swed.) (authorizing the government-designated authority to grant exemptions from prohibitions on transfer of personal
data to certain states).
158. See Lewis E-mail, supra note 151.
159. Id.
160. Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, I13003.
161. Id. at I-13004.
162. Id. at I-13004– I-13006.
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tuted “personal data processing” covered by the Directive.163 With a bit
more difficulty, the Court determined that Lindqvist’s website did not
qualify for any of the exceptions to the personal data processing covered by
the Directive.164 Lindqvist invoked two exceptions allowed under the
Directive: one for activities that fall “outside the scope of Community law”
and one for data processing “by a natural person in the course of a purely
personal or household activity.”165 The Court decided that her webpage
did not qualify for the latter exception because it was accessible to the
entire universe of web users; it was not confined to the home or to the
personal realm.166 The Court went on to interpret the exception for activities “outside the scope of Community law” as limited to activities falling
under the Second and Third Pillars.167 The Court therefore held that this
exception was also unavailable to her.168 Even though Lindqvist’s website
did not constitute a classic exercise of one of the four market freedoms— it
was religious and charitable in nature— it also did not constitute an exercise of Second or Third Pillar activities.169 As a result, the Swedish registration system for personal data applied to personal websites, not only to
web operators like large commercial vendors and internet providers.
It is worthwhile to dwell for a moment on the extraordinary reach of
the Data Protection Directive. In narrowly interpreting the exception for
activities falling outside of Community law, the Court adopted an expansive reading of the Directive. The provision at issue reads:
This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data . . . in the
course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such
as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union
[Second and Third Pillars] and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security (including the economic
well-being of the State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law . . . .170

In giving meaning to the phrase “outside the scope of Community
law,” the Court relied heavily on the reference to the Second and Third
Pillars that immediately followed, as well as on the core subject areas of the
Second and Third Pillar listed thereafter.171 It found, using the canon of
construction of ejusdem generis, that only activities of the same nature as
public security, defense, state security, and criminal law were to be considered “outside the scope of Community law.”172 In doing so, the Court
163. See id. at I-13008.
164. See id. at I-13014.
165. Id. at I-130012– 13.
166. Id. at I-13014.
167. Id. at I-13013.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 1995 Data Protection Directive, supra note 109, at 39.
171. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-130012– 13.
172. See id. Ejusdem generis dictates that “when a word or phrase follows a list of
specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the
same type as those listed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).
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departed from the opinion of the Advocate General, who had advised that
activities should be considered within the scope of Community law only if
they entailed the exercise of one of the four market freedoms or if they were
regulated under a specific Community law that was enacted under one of
the Community’s competences.173 The Court’s interpretation also
departed from the plain meaning of the Directive; the use of the phrase
“such as” suggested that the Second and Third Pillars and the types of
operations typical of those pillars should be taken as an illustrative, not
exhaustive, list of activities falling outside Community law. It was clear
that the Court’s interpretation was driven not so much by the text as by the
specter of future litigation. If the Court were to hold otherwise and find
that the Directive applied to only market-related activities, how would
future courts distinguish between market-related and other activities?
Setting aside the question of whether this interpretation was right, it
accentuates the tension between a European law drafted in the early 1990s,
before information technology had become a pervasive feature of daily life
for the vast majority of citizens, and the application of that same law today.
The drafters of the Directive could not have anticipated the incredible
democratization of information technologies that has occurred over the
past ten years. Because of this democratization, privacy principles today
are relevant not only to big economic and government operators with the
capacity to gather large amounts of personal information, such as banks,
telecommunications providers, and government welfare agencies. With
digital technology and the Internet, anyone can gather and disseminate
vast quantities of personal information, and therefore anyone can violate
the right to data privacy. Even though privacy principles should certainly
guide individuals like Lindqvist who benefit from the tremendous potential
of information technologies, it is doubtful that the same regulatory scheme
that applies to large commercial and government operators is also appropriate for individual citizens.
The Court did, however, limit the Directive’s scope in one way. It
found that the mere act of making personal data available to individuals in
third countries through the World Wide Web did not constitute a transfer
of that personal data to third countries.174 Although the Directive nowhere
defines the term “transfer,” the Court found that this interpretation was
necessary to prevent a specific set of duties— applicable only to third-country transfers— from becoming a general set of duties, applicable to all operations using the World Wide Web.175 In the Swedish case, this
interpretation relieved both individuals like Lindqvist of the duty to obtain
regulatory authorization before posting personal information on the
internet and the Swedish data-protection authority of the burden of reviewing and approving applications from thousands of individuals like
Lindqvist.
173. See Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13011.
174. See id. at I-13020.
175. See id.
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Lindqvist’s challenge to her prosecution based on her right to freedom
of expression raises a number of issues related to the theme of constitutional patriotism. She claimed that both the requirements of the Directive
as well as the application of the Directive in her specific case breached the
right to freedom of expression.176 Under European human rights law, the
freedom of expression analysis is identical to the three-step privacy analysis reviewed earlier: any interference with the right must be authorized by
law, must seek to accomplish a legitimate purpose, and must be proportionate to the burden placed on the right.177 In Lindqvist’s view, the terms
of the Directive were not precise enough to satisfy the fundamental-rights
requirement that any interference with the right to expression be based on
a law specific enough to place citizens on notice of the extent and nature of
the government interference.178 She also argued that the Directive failed to
satisfy the proportionality requirement because the Directive’s various privacy safeguards disproportionately burdened her right to expression.179
Furthermore, according to Lindqvist, even if the Directive as a whole were
to be found lawful, in her particular case the burden on her freedom of
expression should be considered disproportionate. In her view, the interference with her colleagues’ right to privacy was minimal, given that most
of the personal information on her webpage was either already publicly
available or trivial.180 Under such circumstances, her right to free expression should prevail, not the other way around.
The Court rejected Lindqvist’s freedom-of-expression challenge but, at
the same time, directed the Swedish court to take into account Lindqvist’s
right to freedom of expression.181 The Court acknowledged that some of
the Directive’s terms were vague and allowed for considerable choice at the
national level when the Directive was implemented into national law.182
The Court dismissed these concerns, however, as intrinsic to the policy
area; a far-reaching regulatory scheme seeking to cover data protection
throughout the economy was necessarily broadly drafted.183 In addition,
the Court found that the Directive took adequate account of freedom of
expression by requiring that in the application of the Directive, the right to
freedom of expression should always be balanced against the right to data
protection as well as the other rights and interests advanced in the Directive.184 The Court concluded by directing the Swedish court to conduct
the balancing exercise:
176. Id. at I-13021.
177. See OVEY & WHITE, supra note 46, at 317– 20.
178. See Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13021. More particularly, she argued that the
definition of “processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means” did not
fulfill the criteria of predictability and accuracy. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at I-13023– 24.
183. See id. at I-13024 (“It is true that, in many respects, the Member States have a
margin for maneuver in implementing Directive 95/46.”).
184. Id. at I-13023– 24.
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1. Thus, it is, rather, at the stage of the application at national level of the
legislation implementing Directive 95/46 in individual cases that a balance must be found between the rights and interests involved.
2. In that context, fundamental rights have a particular importance, as
demonstrated by the case in the main proceedings, in which, in essence,
Mrs. Lindqvist’s freedom of expression in her work preparing people for
Communion and her freedom to carry out activities contributing to
religious life have to be weighed against the protection of the private life
of the individuals about whom Mrs. Lindqvist has placed data on her
internet site.
3. Consequently, it is for the authorities and courts of the Member States
not only to interpret their national law in a manner consistent with
Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order or with the other general principles
of Community law, such as inter alia the principle of
proportionality.185

By sending the fundamental rights question back to the Swedish
court, the Court of Justice both avoided a difficult issue and allowed for
considerable national discretion. The fundamental-rights balance between
privacy and speech is by no means a precise science and by holding the
Swedish court responsible for the balancing, the Court acknowledged that
the outcome would be distinctive to Swedish law. In other words, as a
member of the European constitutional order, the Swedish court was
required to consider both privacy and freedom of expression, but the
accommodation of these two fundamental values was to be distinctive to
Sweden’s constitutional order.186 Of course, in the future, the Court of
Justice might choose to give a European answer to the privacy-speech
conundrum. For the time being, however, the Court has decided that the
better site for the resolution of such thorny issues is national constitutional
law.
This constitutional settlement is reminiscent of many other areas of
Community law. In deciding on the public policy exceptions to the fundamental market freedoms, the Court of Justice has always been reluctant to
interfere with national legal orders in those cases in which the exception
cannot be reduced to science but rather appears to have longstanding
moral or religious roots. In a series of cases starting in the mid-1980s, the
Court of Justice was called upon by the British courts to decide whether
local rules prohibiting commerce on Sundays were compatible with the
duty to allow for free movement of goods under the EC Treaty.187 In
Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q PLC, the Court found that such rules
could, in theory, reduce trade in goods among Member States and, there185. Id. at I-13024.
186. Id. (noting that member states must endeavor “not only to interpret their
national law in a manner consistent with Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do
not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental
rights protected by the Community legal order or with the other general principles of
Community law”).
187. See Case C-145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q PLC., 1989 E.C.R. 3851.
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fore, to use the doctrinal language of European law, be “caught” by Article
28 of the EC Treaty.188 The Court also found, however, that the prohibition on Sunday trading might be justified as a legitimate social policy.189
This social policy has such obvious Christian origins that there was no
need for the Court to be explicit; Sundays, in the Christian tradition,
should be devoted to God, not to the pursuit of worldly, commercial activities. But rather than conduct the required proportionality analysis, the
Court sent the question back to the British court.190 Thus, the Court recognized that the British court was best placed to address the inordinately
difficult challenge of reconciling religion and the life habits that accompany religion with the demands of contemporary economic life and membership in a free trade area.191 In essence, the Court acknowledged that
this was a matter of the British— not European— constitutional order and
that only the British court could conceivably resolve the dilemma.
In fact, not even the British courts were up to the challenge. After a
number of conflicting rulings in the British lower courts, the matter went
to the House of Lords.192 The House of Lords, rather than decide the
issue, referred another question to the Court of Justice: What criteria
should it use to decide the proportionality of regulatory restrictions on
Sunday trading?193 Only reluctantly, therefore, did the Court of Justice
settle this thorny problem. And rather than answer the question directly
and elaborate on the appropriate proportionality criteria, the Court simply
declared that the Sunday trading rules were proportionate.194 By giving a
preliminary ruling in the sparest of terms, the European law on the correct
compromise between old mores and new commerce was left as vague as
possible.
Another illustration of the Court’s deferential approach to national
constitutionalism is Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn.195 The contending values in
the case were free movement of services and human dignity. Omega
188. See id. at 3889. The Court notoriously reversed itself on this point in C-267/91,
Criminal Proceedings Against Keck & Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-6097, I-6131. Please
note that C-267/91 is a combination of the two original cases: C-267/91 and C-268/91.
See id. at Issue 1.
189. See Torfaen Borough Council, 1989 E.C.R. at 3889.
190. See id. As with the right to privacy, before a public policy reason can trump the
right to free movement of goods, the proportionality principle must be satisfied: the
restriction on the free movement of goods must be necessary for satisfying the public
policy end and the burden on free movement of goods must be proportionate to the end
being pursued. See id. at 3888.
191. See id.
192. See Council of the City of Stoke-on-Trent & Norwich City Council v. B&Q PLC.
1992 E.C.R. I-6635, I-6656 (discussing different possible interpretations arising out of
three British rulings).
193. See id. at I-6656– 57.
194. Id. at I-6659.
195. Case C-36/02, Omega Speilhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v.
Oberburgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609.
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owned and operated a laserdrome in Germany.196 Although Omega was a
German company, it operated under a franchise agreement with a British
firm, and therefore it was covered by the free-movement-of-services provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.197 Soon after
Omega opened its doors to the public, it was ordered by the local authorities to cease part of its operations— games involving shooting laser beams
at human targets.198 The justification for the order was the offense to
human dignity perpetrated by such laser games.199 According to the German authorities, “[T]he games which took place in Omega’s establishment
constituted a danger to public order, since the acts of simulated homicide
and the trivialization of violence thereby engendered were contrary to fundamental values prevailing in public opinion.”200
Omega appealed to the German administrative courts.201 The courts
found that, indeed, such games constituted an offense to human dignity
and therefore had been banned legitimately.202 However, the highest
administrative court referred to the Court of Justice the question of the
compatibility of the German right to human dignity with the European
guarantee of free movement of services: Could Germany take advantage of
the public policy exception to the principle of free movement of services
based on a right that, at least in the specifics, was not common to all Member States, i.e., a right to human dignity that included a prohibition on
laser games?203
The Court of Justice answered in the affirmative.204 It found that
respect for human dignity was as much a part of European law as it was of
German law and, therefore, the protection of human dignity qualified as a
legitimate reason for restricting free movement.205 The means or “system
of protection” in favor of human dignity in one Member State did not have
to mirror the system of protection in other Member States for it to be considered legitimate.206 Of course, consistent with the Court’s earlier case
law, a rights-based restriction on free movement, like any other restriction,
had to satisfy the proportionality test.207 The Court of Justice then
reviewed the German court’s holding and found that it had appropriately
applied these European principles.208
196. Id. at I-9643 (noting that a laserdome is a facility in which players using “submachine-gun-type laser targeting devices and sensory tags fixed either in the firing corridors or to jackets worn by players” competed against each other for amusement).
197. See id. at I-9643.
198. Id. at I-9644.
199. Id. at I-9645.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at I-9655.
205. Id. at I-9653.
206. Id. at I-9654.
207. See id. at I-9653.
208. Id. at I-9654.
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Contrary to Lindqvist and Torfaen Borough, the Court of Justice in
Omega did not accommodate national diversity by sending the task of balancing constitutional values back to the national court. Rather, the Court
resorted to another judicial technique, reviewing the findings of the German authorities under the deferential standard of “margin of discretion.”209 The Court explained this standard of review as follows: “[T]he
specific circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public
policy may vary from one country to another and from one era to another.
The competent national authorities must therefore be allowed a margin of
discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.”210 The Court scrupulously applied this standard to the facts of the case. In examining the rationale for the German ban and the proportionality of the ban, the Court
deferred extensively to the reasons given by the local administrative authority and the referring court.211 In reaching the conclusion that the ban was
permissible, the Court refused to substitute its judgment for that of the
German authorities.212 Instead of concluding that the ban was justified,
the Court found that the ban could not be regarded as “unjustifiably
undermining the freedom to provide services.”213 Although, on its face,
this word choice might appear trivial, it is indeed important. It signifies
that, under European law, the authority to decide the balance between the
market and human dignity rests primarily with the German courts; the
European Court of Justice may interfere only in those extreme cases in
which that national authority appears to have been abused. It is for German courts to determine whether a rights-based restriction on the market
is justified and for the European Court of Justice to guarantee that this
national determination is not unjustified.
These cases demonstrate that on tough constitutional questions, like
the balance between privacy and expression or between human dignity and
market rights, the Court of Justice gives precedence to national constitutionalism. By sending constitutional questions back to national courts and
employing the deferential review standard of margin of discretion, the
Court avoids the pitfalls of constitutional patriotism. It affirms a set of
principles common to the entire European Union yet also defers to national
constitutional values. In other words, it tolerates constitutional diversity.
Another way to understand these judicial techniques of constitutional
tolerance is by reference to the sociology of the European center. In cases
like Lindqvist and Omega, the Court rightly recognizes that the public
sphere of Europe is still too thin to provide an answer to most of the difficult questions of constitutional law. In the language of Rawls, in these
areas, there are no terms of fair cooperation to which Europe’s gradually
emerging society of citizens could agree.214 To take the privacy example,
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at I-9652.
Id.
Id. at I-9652, I-9654.
Id. at I-9654.
Id.
See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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although European citizens might agree that individuals should be entitled
to speak about others and at the same time, to lead part of their lives in
private, the deeper question of how to resolve conflicting claims to speech
and privacy has no answer. If the Court of Justice were to attempt to
resolve the matter, it would be deciding entirely at random. Of course,
courts like the Court of Justice contribute to making a constitutional culture, yet they do not do so in a social void. They do so in the context of a
dense set of institutions and social practices that serve to enable collective
life in a community. There is no objective indicator of the point at which
the institutional and cultural fabric of a new society is thick enough that a
court like the European Court of Justice can begin giving meaningful
answers to constitutional questions like the privacy-speech balance. But if
the Court prematurely attempts to resolve such questions, it risks, at best,
irrelevance, at worst, delegitimation. At best, the Court’s judgment will be
obeyed but will be entirely marginal to future debates on that constitutional
question. At worst, the lack of social foundation for the Court’s judgment
will justify disobedience in that case or in future cases.
B.

Von Hannover v. Germany (Princess of Monaco)

Because of its history, the European Court of Human Rights has had
many more opportunities than the European Court of Justice to address the
right to privacy, as well as the inevitable conflicts that arise between the
right to privacy and the right to free expression. In doing so, the ECtHR
has been far less shy than the ECJ about reversing national decisions. It
has shown considerably less deference toward national courts and has
intervened actively in domestic decision-making, sometimes on the side of
privacy, sometimes on the side of speech.
The ECtHR’s doctrinal tools for negotiating the relationship between
national and supranational constitutionalism are somewhat different from
those of the ECJ. The system of jurisdiction established under the European Convention on Human Rights does not contemplate preliminary references.215 Rather, individuals must exhaust their legal remedies at the
national level, obtaining a final national judgment, before they may apply
to the ECtHR for relief.216 One consequence of this system of jurisdiction
is that the ECtHR cannot send legal issues back to national courts for final
resolution.217 In its judgments, the ECtHR must decide once and for all
whether there has been a breach of the Convention. The judicial dialogue
made possible in the European Union by virtue of the preliminary reference system has no analogue in the European Convention on Human
Rights.
215. The ECJ has preliminary reference jurisdiction. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra
note 49, at 432. The ECtHR does not have preliminary reference jurisdiction among its
forms of jurisdiction. See OVEY & WHITE, supra note 46, at 8– 11.
216. Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby art. 35,
May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol 11].
217. See id. art. 44 (noting that the ECtHR issues final judgments).
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The ECtHR, however, employs a deference doctrine similar to the margin of discretion that was afforded to Germany in the Omega Case: Member
States, in balancing fundamental rights against other fundamental rights
or public interest objectives, benefit from a “margin of appreciation.”218
The concept does not appear in the European Convention on Human
Rights but rather is a creation of the ECtHR. It was first articulated by the
ECtHR in the 1970s in a series of cases involving the public emergency
derogation to human rights.219 Later, the concept was extended to a number of other human-rights areas, including interferences with the right to
privacy under Article 8 and with the right to free expression under Article
10.220 The deference given to Member States under the doctrine of margin
of appreciation can save an interference with a Convention right at two
distinct phases of the legal analysis: (1) in assessing the importance of the
public policy or competing individual right that serves as the government
justification for the interference with the right and (2) in assessing the proportionality of the interference with the right.221
The rationale for affording Member States discretion in making a
determination on fundamental rights is similar to the one explored earlier
in the context of the ECJ: because national authorities are situated socially
and culturally they are their in a better position than the ECtHR to give
specific effect to the highly abstract commitments of the Convention. As
the ECtHR stated in an early case on freedom of expression,
[B]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of
their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements [of free expression and the conditions under which a State’s interference with free expression is justified].222

Most commentators agree that as the ECtHR has matured as a court, it
has become tougher on defending Member States and more reluctant to
defer to them through the doctrine of margin of appreciation.223 This is
certainly evident in the domains of privacy and freedom of expression.224
218. Case C-36/02, Omega Speilhallen, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609, I-9652. Indeed, on their
face, the doctrines of margin of discretion and margin of appreciation are identical. The
linguistic difference is an artifact of different English translations from the same French
term of art “marge d’appréciation.” See generally James Sweeney, ‘Margin of Appreciation’
in the ECJ and ECHR, 34 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 27, 28– 36 (2007) (comparing the ECJ’s case law with the ECtHR’s doctrine of margin of appreciation).
219. CAMERON, supra note 52, at 28; see HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
(1996).
220. See CAMERON, supra note 52, at 28– 29.
221. See id. at 30.
222. Handyside v. The United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49 (1976).
223. See YOUROW, supra note 219, at 56; Sweeney, supra note 218, at 42.
224. In other areas, however, the movement away from the margin of appreciation is
less clear. Indeed, according to some commentators, the ECtHR continues to rely heavily on the doctrine to decide a wide variety of cases. See Benvenisti, supra note 14, at
846; Carozza, supra note 15, at 57.
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This reluctance to tolerate national constitutional diversity is dramatically
at odds with the approach taken by the ECJ, analyzed in Part III.
The recent case of Von Hannover v. Germany (Princess of Monaco)
illustrates the different approach taken by the ECtHR in resolving conflicting claims to privacy and freedom of expression.225 At issue in the case
were three separate German judgments, involving three different series of
photographs of the Princess and her family.226 These photographs, taken
without her consent, were published in a number of different German
weekly magazines.227 At the time of publication of each series of photographs, the Princess of Monaco brought suit before the German courts to
enjoin their publication. The litigation concerning the first series of photographs was the most exhaustive and gave rise to extensively reasoned opinions by both the Federal Court of Justice (the highest court for the system
of civil and criminal justice) and the Federal Constitutional Court.228 The
subsequent litigation involving the two other series of photographs was
decided based on this precedent and, therefore, from a legal-reasoning perspective, holds less interest.229
The first series of photographs captured the Princess in a variety of
situations. She was shown with Vincent Lindon, a French actor and her
boyfriend at the time, in a secluded restaurant courtyard.230 She appeared
together with her children in various public places, such as the market.231
She was also shown alone, horseback riding and shopping.232 Both the
German court of first instance and the German court of appeals took the
conventional view of privacy and held against the Princess.233 They found
that as an “absolute figure of contemporary history” (eine absolute Person
der Zeitgeschichte), the Princess could not protest the publication of her
photographs.234 Because of their importance to contemporary debate,
such figures could only claim a right to privacy when in the home, not
when in public spaces.235 The Federal Court of Justice was more sympathetic to the Princess. It found that a concept of privacy limited to the
home, even in the case of public figures like the Princess, was too narrow.236 Such figures should be able to prevent the public from prying even
outside the home, in other spaces of “seclusion.”237 In the court’s view,
the restaurant courtyard in which the Princess was photographed eating
with Vincent Lindon was precisely such a space of seclusion.238 The
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 23 (2005).
Id. at 6– 16.
Id. at 5– 6.
Id. at 7– 15.
Id. at 15– 16.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5– 6.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7– 8.
Id.
Id.
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court, therefore, enjoined the publication of the restaurant photographs
but permitted publication of the remaining photographs because they
involved entirely public places.239
That, however, was not the end of the matter. The Princess of Monaco
filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court.240
In one respect, the court expanded her right to privacy. It found that children’s privacy should receive special constitutional protection.241 Children, the Federal Constitutional Court reasoned, were especially
vulnerable to the autonomy harms caused by privacy violations because
their personalities were still developing.242 Unless a public figure like the
Princess of Monaco intentionally took center stage at a public event with
her children, the interest of the press and the public in knowing about the
children must give way to the children’s privacy.243 The court therefore
enjoined the publication of all those photographs in which the Princess’s
children appeared.244 Remaining in the public eye were only those photographs in which she appeared horseback riding and shopping.245
Based on this reasoning, the German courts rejected two later lawsuits
brought by the Princess, seeking to enjoin the publication of two other sets
of photographs.246 The first series of photographs showed the Princess
enjoying different sports together with her husband, Prince Ernst August
von Hannover.247 The second showed her stumbling at the pool of a private country club.248 Both series of photographs, according to the German
courts, involved places fully visible to the public eye.249 They neither
objectively demonstrated an effort by the Princess to create a place of seclusion,250 nor were they taken of her together with her children.251 Therefore, before the German courts, the public interest in the photographs of
the Princess prevailed.252
The Princess had better luck before the European Court of Human
Rights. The Court found that the publication of all of the photographs at
issue in the three German proceedings violated the Princess’s right to private life.253 The Court first elaborated on the value of the right to private
life.254 In doing so, it sought to identify, in abstract terms, the values
underpinning the right to private life and in concrete terms, the circum239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15– 16.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 16.
See id.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 28– 29.
Id. at 23.
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stances under which the Court would recognize the right.255
[P]rivate life, in the Court’s view, includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is
primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference,
of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human
beings . . . . There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with others,
even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of “private life.”256

How would the Court identify the zone that fell within the scope of
“private life”? The Court said that it would consider “whether the material
thus obtained was envisaged for a limited use or was likely to be made
available to the general public.”257 Because the photographs showed the
Princess in her daily life, not engaged in public functions, the Court found
that the photographs belonged to her private life.258
The Court then turned to the competing right of freedom of expression. It emphasized the importance of free expression and the press to a
democratic society: the press had a duty to impart “information and ideas
on all matters of public interest.”259 Yet, at the same time, the Court
underscored the duties and responsibilities of the press: “it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the rights of others.”260
The balance between the two rights, however, was struck in favor of
the Princess and the right to privacy.261 The Court reached this conclusion based on the low value that it attached to the speech involved in the
case.262 The Court employed an implicit hierarchy of speech.263 At the
bottom of this hierarchy, the Court placed the photographs of the Princess
and declared them unworthy of protection, at least when in conflict with
the right to privacy.264 The Court drew three distinctions.265 First,
according to the Court, words were superior to images because words generally communicated ideas whereas images could convey very personal
information.266 Second, expression concerning politicians was considered
255. Id. at 24.
256. Id. at 23.
257. Id. at 24.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 25.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 27.
262. Id. (“[T]he Court considers that the publication of the photos and articles in
question . . . cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society
. . . .”).
263. Id. at 25 (“Although freedom of expression also extends to the publication of
photos, this is an area in which the protection of the rights and reputation of others
takes on particular importance. The present case does not concern the dissemination of
‘ideas,’ but of images containing very personal or even intimate ‘information’ about an
individual.”).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 25– 27.
266. Id. at 25 (“[P]hotos appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of
continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of
intrusion into their private life or even of persecution.”).
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more valuable than expression concerning private individuals.267 In the
view of the Court, the Princess was a private individual because she did
not exercise official functions on the behalf of the State of Monaco.268 The
third distinction employed by the Court was between information on an
individual’s public and private life.269 Only in special circumstances did
the public have the right to learn of the latter.270 These photographs combined the worst of all categories: as photographs of a private figure and of
the private life of that figure, they deserved no protection.271 Thus, the
Court held that Germany, in permitting publication of the photographs,
had violated the right to privacy under the European Convention on
Human Rights.272 In reaching this decision, the Court made only passing
reference to Germany’s margin of appreciation on the rights question.273
The purpose of this article is not to assess the correctness of the
Court’s balance between privacy and expression in the Princess of Monaco
case. This consideration of the Court’s reasoning is simply designed to
show that there is ample room for disagreement on the matter. It would
not be unreasonable to attach greater value to the photographs than was
done in the case and, consequently, to find that the right to know about the
Princess’s activities trumped the Princess’s right to privacy. This, in
essence, is the conclusion that was reached by the German courts. The
European Court of Human Rights failed to take heed of Germany’s constitutional settlement.
IV. Tolerant and Intolerant Constitutional Patriotism
The contrast between the case law of the two courts is striking.
Although the ECJ deferred to national law on the privacy-speech question,
the ECtHR handled the matter directly under European law.274 In this
instance, given the circumstances of the two cases, the ECJ followed the
better path. The Lindqvist judgment both affirmed a European commitment to privacy and free expression and made room for diverse moral
267. Id. at 26 (“The Court considers that a fundamental distinction needs to be made
between reporting facts— even controversial ones— capable of contributing to a debate in
a democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this
case, does not exercise official functions.”).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 27 (“[T]he Court considers that the publication of the photos and articles
in question, the sole purpose of which was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the applicant’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute
to any debate of general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the
public.”).
270. Id. at 26.
271. Id. at 27.
272. Id. at 29.
273. Id. at 28.
274. Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, I13024; see also Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 20 (citing Article 8 of the Convention
as the relevant standard).
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orderings of public life at the national level.275 In the future, the ECtHR
would do well to make heavier use of the legal doctrine of margin of appreciation so as to negotiate a similar compromise between European universalism and national particularism.
Certainly, there are reasons for European courts to intervene directly
in privacy cases. A national court’s resolution of the right claims might be
so clearly one-sided in favor of the government’s interference with privacy
or a competing rights claim that the decision constitutes a breach of European law. Furthermore, as a matter of institution-building, supranational
courts must sometimes intervene. If supranational courts always hold for
defending states, against complainants, they risk appearing to be mere
puppets of those states, not independent lawgivers. However, neither of
these reasons existed in the Princess of Monaco case. The German courts
carefully considered the Princess’s claims and, in the course of the litigation, progressively limited access to the Princess’s private life.276 The
remaining right to know— the photographs of the Princess in non-secluded
places by herself or in the company of other adults— had a plausible relationship to public debate.277 The Princess of Monaco is a member of a
ruling royal family.278 She herself does not govern, but she does benefit
directly from a system of public authority that, like all other such systems,
should be subject to scrutiny, debate, and criticism. Germany’s resolution
of the privacy-speech conflict in favor of the press was not so biased as to
constitute a breach of European law. The ECtHR was also not at risk of
appearing to be a tool of powerful sovereign states. Set against the Court’s
long track record of deciding cases against defending states, a judgment in
favor of Germany would not have had the appearance of capitulation to
national interest.
Instead, in the Princess of Monaco case, the countervailing consideration of tolerance for constitutional pluralism should have prevailed. The
German courts were expounding a national view of the right and good
organization of public debate. That view was consistent with the constitutional law of certain other national systems and at odds with others. In the
Princess of Monaco litigation itself, the lower courts acknowledged that,
had French instead of German law applied, the case would have come
down in favor of the Princess.279 But the German decision in favor of the
press was in line with the law in other European countries. For instance,
275. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. at I-13025.
276. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 19, 1995, 131 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 332 (F.R.G), translated in
BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE
TREATISE 444, 449 (4th ed. 2002); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1999, 101 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfGE] 361 (F.R.G), translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra, at 450, 462.
277. See 101 BVerfGE 361, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 276, at
459– 61.
278. See 131 BGHZ 332, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 276, at 445.
279. See 131 BGHZ 332, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 276, at 449.
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under English law, the press would also have prevailed.280 Given this
diversity and the absence, still, of a thick European public sphere, the
ECtHR should have deferred to Germany’s constitutional settlement.
This, of course, was the outcome of Lindqvist.281 In that case, the ECJ
deferred to national constitutionalism by deliberately not deciding the privacy-speech conflict.282 Instead, the ECJ sent the legal question back to
the Swedish court.283 This move was made possible by the preliminary
reference system, a system of jurisdiction unavailable to the ECtHR. However, the ECtHR’s longstanding doctrine of margin of appreciation can
serve a similar end. Based on the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Member States, the ECtHR could have deferred to the privacy-speech balance
struck by the German courts.
Many scholars take a dim view of the doctrine of margin of appreciation. The ECtHR’s resort to the doctrine is cast as the abandonment of
rights, morality, and reason in the face of powerful, oppressive states.284
Yet, as demonstrated by this article’s review of the ECJ’s use of analogous
doctrines, the margin of appreciation can serve good purposes too. It is
not just a face-saving device for a supranational court opposed by powerful
Member States. With deference doctrines, courts can construct a supranational constitutional order and, at the same time, recognize and respect
national constitutionalism. Deference doctrines, like the margin of appreciation, can safeguard constitutional pluralism even as a single European
constitution is being built.
To understand the contribution that such doctrines can make to constitutional pluralism, it is important to appreciate the difference between
ordinary appellate review and review by one court of another court’s determination of law based on a deferential standard of review. In an ordinary
judicial system, higher courts generally do not give any special consideration to the determinations of law made by lower courts.285 In other words,
if a determination of law is appealed to a higher court, the higher court will
decide the legal question de novo.286 To take an example from the earlier
280. See Sir Brian Neill, Privacy: A Challenge for the Next Century, in PROTECTING PRI1– 4 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1999); see also Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers, Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] A.C. 457 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
281. See Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I12971, I-13029– 30.
282. See id.
283. See id. (“It is for the national authorities and courts responsible for applying the
national legislation implementing Directive 95/46 to ensure a fair balance between the
rights and interests in question, including the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order.”).
284. See Benvenisti, supra note 14, at 847; Letsas, supra note 14, at 731– 32.
285. On the U.S. system, see HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 6 (2007). On a typical European legal system, see Michele Taruffo,
Civil Procedure and the Path of a Civil Case, in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 159, 176
(Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo Mattei eds., 2002)
286. This discussion does not address appellate review of questions of fact. On questions of fact, higher courts generally defer to lower courts because lower courts are better equipped to establish the facts in a particular case. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra
note 285, at 6– 7. Moreover, a question of fact is, by definition, limited to the particular
VACY
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discussion of the Princess of Monaco case, even though the German lower
courts had already decided that a public figure like the Princess of Monaco
could not assert a privacy right outside the home, the German Federal
Court of Justice and then the Federal Constitutional Court each decided
the question anew.287 These courts could review the issues independently
because courts in a single judicial system all share in the same judicial
power, and the courts at the apex of the system relate hierarchically to the
courts at the bottom of the system. In the interest of coming to the best
resolution of a question of law— questions which, by definition, have implications for an entire legal system— a court of last resort is bound to give
fresh consideration to the various interpretive possibilities.
By contrast, deferential standards of review carry an acknowledgment
of the independent power of the government body under review. Such
standards are employed routinely by national courts tasked with reviewing
parliamentary laws and executive decisions.288 The judicial branch recognizes that, under traditional separation of powers principles, the legislative
and executive branches are vested with independent lawmaking and
administrative powers.289 Courts are not supposed to legislate or to execute, just to adjudicate.290 In other words, judicial intervention is warranted only if the decision of the legislature or the executive appears to be
so misguided as to violate a command set down in the constitution or, in
the case of an administrative decision, the applicable legislation. Judicial
deference is the doctrinal recognition of this system of separate powers.
Deference in supranational judicial systems signifies the same type of
institutional relationship but between courts rather than branches of government. Each court— European and national— is vested with independent
powers. National courts are authorized to interpret their national constitutions;291 the two European courts are authorized to interpret the emerging
European constitutional order.292 Deferential review by the European
courts represents an acknowledgment of the extensive set of moral commitments set down in national constitutions and the privileged role of
national courts as interpreters of those moral commitments. The European
case before the court and therefore a lower court’s determination will not reverberate
throughout the legal system. See id.
287. See 131 BGHZ 332, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 276, at
444– 49; 101 BVerfGE 361, translated in MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 276, at
450– 62.
288. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 142– 44 (4th ed. 2002).
On review of laws, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 629– 36 (1997) (rational basis review).
289. For the conventional U.S. position, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 288, at 1, 47.
On the European position, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 14– 17,
35– 37 (2d ed. 1985).
290. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 288, at 46– 48.
291. See, e.g., Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (federal constitution)
art. 93(1.1) (F.R.G).
292. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. I-29, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004
O.J. (C 310) 1, 24– 25, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:
310:SOM:EN:HTML; Protocol 11, supra note 216, art. 32.
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courts should intervene only if national constitutional authority is abused
and the minimum standards set down in Europe’s still-fledging constitution are violated.
This argument in favor of the ECtHR’s resort to the margin of appreciation does not take lightly the human rights critique of the doctrine.
Human rights, undoubtedly, contain a universal, moral core.293 Because
human rights inhere in individuals as human beings, not as citizens of one
nation or another, they should not vary depending on geography. They
should give rise to the same treatment everywhere. Defending a universal
set of human rights, however, is not incompatible with recognizing constitutional diversity. As the European Court of Justice did in the Lindqvist
case, it is possible both to affirm a common, European privacy right and to
hold that only morally repugnant interferences with the right will constitute a human rights violation. Otherwise, depending on the national context, the privacy right might be trumped by competing rights or public
policies. The recognition of such pluralism, of course, narrows the reach
of human rights law, but if Europe truly values its different traditions of
social organization and political contestation, it does not seem that it could
be otherwise.294
In the human rights world, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation
has been the subject not only of critique but also of praise. The praise
comes, essentially, in two varieties: the first casts the doctrine as advancing
certain principles that are part and parcel of the moral architecture of
human rights,295 whereas the second treats the doctrine in pragmatic
terms, as a necessary judicial tool in an international realm of sovereign
states reluctant to accept the dictates of international institutions.296 The
constitutional patriotism analysis in this article contributes to this literature by advancing a separate reason for the normative desirability of the
margin of appreciation: because the ECtHR defends a European constitution it should be sensitive to the imperatives of tolerance that are part of
that constitution.
In essence, this analysis treats the ECtHR as a constitutional court, not
simply an international human rights tribunal. The rights that are
defended by the Court are not simply universal moral standards but individual entitlements that arise because of citizenship in a particular social
community and political order— Europe. The ECtHR’s stature as a consti293. The debate on relativism versus universalism in the human rights arena and the
implications for the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation is extensive. For the universalist
position and a critical view of the margin of appreciation, see Benvenisti, supra note 14,
at 847; Letsas, supra note 14, at 731– 32.
294. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration: Iconography
and Fetishism, in DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 59, 66 (Erik Oddvar Eriksen et
al. eds., 2004).
295. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 15, at 46– 50, 56– 63 (arguing in favor of the margin
of appreciation based on the human rights principle of subsidiarity); Paul Mahoney,
Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 10 HUMAN RTS L.J. 1,
2– 3 (arguing in favor of the margin of appreciation based on subsidiarity, democracy,
and cultural diversity).
296. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 16, at 282– 91.
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tutional court is not a matter of explicit design but rather is a byproduct of
the intertwined nature of rights in the European Union and the Council of
Europe, as well as the incremental, yet spectacular, success of European
integration. This article’s earlier description of the many norms and institutions that guarantee a European right to privacy is but one example of
the overlapping and self-reinforcing nature of rights in Europe today. The
European Union’s court— the ECJ— is widely recognized as a constitutional
court. When the ECJ interprets the treaties and establishes fundamental
principles of law, it gives shape to public power and individual rights
throughout the European Union. It makes very little sense to deny this
same constitutional status to the ECtHR when both the positive instruments and the judicial precedent that serve as the basis for their decisions
are reciprocally determined and inextricably interwoven. Thus, under the
theory of constitutional patriotism, both courts should be self-conscious of
the importance of fundamental rights in their particular geographic and
historical instantiations to national self-identities. Before reaching a European determination on any particular rights dilemma— like the privacy versus speech conflict in Lindqvist and Von Hannover— both courts should
consider whether such a determination is truly warranted or whether,
indeed, the best European constitutional outcome is tolerance of national
diversity.
Conclusion
The emerging European right to privacy reveals both the identity-creating potential and the diversity-suppressing dangers of constitutional patriotism. The right has spread to virtually every corner of European
governance. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, privacy
has been construed broadly to protect individuals against most types of
observation— even in public places— and to protect individuals against the
collection of most types of personal information— even if that information
is considered banal or widely available. In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of Europe has the Convention on
Automatic Processing of Personal Data setting down a series of guarantees
specific to data privacy that have been enacted domestically throughout
Europe.
In the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights recognizes
not simply a general right to privacy but also a right to the protection of
personal data. This more specific privacy right is also guaranteed throughout the common market by the European Union’s detailed Data Protection
Directive. When national police, customs officers, and courts cooperate on
law enforcement and immigration policy, they are covered by a similar set
of EU data protection laws.
Already the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court
of Justice have been called upon to interpret this legal framework for privacy. These cases raise hard questions of constitutional law since individual claims to privacy routinely come into conflict with the right of others to
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know— to engage in public debate, transact in the marketplace, or pursue
different types of collective goods. By examining just one subset of this
case law— the privacy-speech balance— it is possible to catch a glimpse of
the community-building possibilities of a shared, European commitment to
rights. In both Lindqvist and Von Hannover, the ECJ and the ECtHR
proudly declared Europe’s respect for free expression and privacy. They
also explained the importance of these rights to the European understanding of the morally good ordering of life in a human community. Quite
obviously, for the ECJ and the ECtHR, liberal values constitute a source of
European unity.
The ringing judicial affirmation in Lindqvist and Von Hannover, however, also carried illiberal undertones, as a court’s declaration of rights
comes with the imperative to protect rights and decide cases regardless of
another court’s resolution of the very same rights claim. In an intrinsically
pluralist political order like Europe, this admittedly noble commitment to
rights can become the illiberal imposition of a uniform, hegemonic constitutional identity. Thus, sometimes the impulse to defer to national courts
on difficult questions of constitutional law, such as the privacy-speech balance in the Lindqvist and Princess of Monaco cases, can be the normatively
superior outcome. In essence, the ECtHR and the ECJ are not like any
ordinary set of constitutional courts. Their constitutional order is founded
upon historically rooted, radical diversity. It is a nascent constitutional
order, lacking the social and institutional infrastructure that would enable
a genuinely European solution to many of the constitutional conflicts that
emerge daily before national courts. Deference, for the European courts, is
an essential instrument of tolerant— and patriotic— constitutionalism.
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